<h2 id="id00032" style="margin-top: 4em">CHAPTER VI.</h2>
<p id="id00033">1797.</p>
<p id="id00034" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> Napoleon's correspondence—Release of French prisoners at Olmutz—
Negotiations with Austria—Bonaparte's dissatisfaction—Letter of
complaint from Bonaparte to the Executive Directory—Note respecting
the affairs of Venice and the Club of Clichy, written by Bonaparte
and circulated in the army—Intercepted letter of the Emperor
Francis.</p>
<p id="id00035">During the time when the preliminaries of Leoben suspended military
operations, Napoleon was not anxious to reply immediately to all letters.
He took a fancy to do, not exactly as Cardinal Dubois did, when he threw
into the fire the letters he had received, saying, "There! my
correspondents are answered," but something of the same kind. To satisfy
himself that people wrote too much, and lost, in trifling and useless
answers, valuable time, he told me to open only the letters which came by
extraordinary couriers, and to leave all the rest for three weeks in the
basket. At the end of that time it was unnecessary to reply to four-
fifths of these communications. Some were themselves answers; some were
acknowledgments of letters received; others contained requests for
favours already granted, but of which intelligence had not been received.
Many were filled with complaints respecting provisions, pay, or clothing,
and orders had been issued upon all these points before the letters were
written. Some generals demanded reinforcements, money, promotion, etc.
By not opening their letters Bonaparte was spared the unpleasing office
of refusing. When the General-in-Chief compared the very small number of
letters which it was necessary to answer with the large number which time
alone had answered, he laughed heartily at his whimsical idea. Would not
this mode of proceeding be preferable to that of causing letters to be
opened by any one who may be employed, and replying to them by a circular
to which it is only necessary to attach a date?</p>
<p id="id00036">During the negotiations which followed the treaty of Leoben, the
Directory ordered General Bonaparte to demand the liberty of MM. de La
Fayette, Latour-Marbourg, and Bureau de Puzy, detained at Olmutz since
1792 as prisoners of state. The General-in-Chief executed this
commission with as much pleasure as zeal, but he often met with
difficulties which appeared to be insurmountable. It has been very
incorrectly stated that these prisoners obtained their liberty by one of
the articles of the preliminaries of Leoben. I wrote a great deal on
this subject to the dictation of General Bonaparte, and I joined him only
on the day after the signature of these preliminaries. It was not till
the end of May of the year 1797 that the liberation of these captives was
demanded, and they did not obtain their freedom till the end of August.
There was no article in the treaty, public or secret, which had reference
to them. Neither was it at his own suggestion that Bonaparte demanded
the enlargement of the prisoners, but by order of the Directory. To
explain why they did not go to France immediately after their liberation
from Olmutz, it is necessary to recollect that the events of the 18th
Fructidor occurred between the period when the first steps were taken to
procure their liberty and the date of their deliverance. It required all
Bonaparte's ascendency and vigour of character to enable him to succeed
in his object at the end of three months.</p>
<p id="id00037">We had arrived at the month of July, and the negotiations were tediously
protracted. It was impossible to attribute the embarrassment which was
constantly occurring to anything but the artful policy of Austria: Other
affairs occupied Bonaparte. The news from Paris engrossed all his
attention. He saw with extreme displeasure the manner in which the
influential orators of the councils, and pamphlets written in the same
spirit as they spoke, criticised him, his army, his victories, the
affairs of Venice, and the national glory. He was quite indignant at the
suspicions which it was sought to create respecting his conduct and
ulterior views.</p>
<p id="id00038">The following excerpts, attributed to the pens of Dumouriez or Rivarol,
are specimens of some of the comments of the time:</p>
<p id="id00039"> EXTRACTS OF LETTERS IN "LE SPECTATUER DU NORD" of 1797.</p>
<p id="id00040" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> General Bonaparte is, without contradiction, the most brilliant
warrior who has appeared at the head of the armies of the French
Republic. His glory is incompatible with democratic equality, and
the services he has rendered are too great to be recompensed except
by hatred and ingratitude. He is very young, and consequently has
to pursue a long career of accusations and of persecutions.</p>
<p id="id00041" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> ……..Whatever may be the crowning event of his military career,
Bonaparte is still a great man. All his glory is due to himself
alone; because he alone has developed a character and a genius of
which no one else has furnished an example.</p>
<p id="id00042" style="margin-top: 2em"> EXTRACT OF LETTER OR 18TH APRIL 1797 in "THE SPECTATEUR DU NORD."</p>
<p id="id00043" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> Regard, for instance, this wretched war. Uncertain in Champagne, it
becomes daring under Dumouriez, unbridled under the brigands who
fought the Vendeeans, methodic under Pichegru, vulgar under Jourdan,
skilled under Moreau, rash under Bonaparte. Each general has put
the seal of his genius on his career, and has given life or death to
his army. From the commencement of his career Bonaparte has
developed an ardent character which is irritated by obstacles, and a
quickness which forestalls every determination of the enemy. It is
with heavier and heavier blows that he strikes. He throws his army
on the enemy like an unloosed torrent. He is all action, and he is
so in everything. See him fight, negotiate, decree, punish, all is
the matter of a moment. He compromises with Turin as with Rome. He
invades Modena as he burns Binasco. He never hesitates; to cut the
Gordian knot is always his method.</p>
<p id="id00044" style="margin-top: 2em">Bonaparte could not endure to have his conduct predicated; and enraged at
seeing his campaigns depreciated, his glory and that of his army
disparaged,</p>
<p id="id00045" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> —[The extraordinary folly of the opposition to the Directory in
throwing Bonaparte on to the side of the Directory, will be seen by
reading the speech of Dumolard, so often referred to by Bourrienne
(Thiers, vol. v. pp. 110-111), and by the attempts of Mathieu Dumas
to remove the impression that the opposition slighted the fortunate
General. (See Dumas, tome iii. p. 80; see also Lanfrey, tome i.
pp. 257-299).]—</p>
<p id="id00046">and intrigues formed against him in the Club of Clichy, he wrote the
following letter to the Directory:—</p>
<h5 id="id00047"> TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.</h5>
<p id="id00048"> I have just received, Citizens-Directors, a copy of the motion of<br/>
Dumolard (23d June 1797).<br/></p>
<p id="id00049" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> This motion, printed by order of the Assembly, it is evident, is
directed against me. I was entitled, after, having five times
concluded peace, and given a death-blow to the coalition, if not to
civic triumphs, at least to live tranquilly under the protection of
the first magistrates of the Republic. At present I find myself
ill-treated, persecuted, and disparaged, by every shameful means,
which their policy brings to the aid of persecution. I would have
been indifferent to all except that species of opprobrium with which
the first magistrates of the Republic endeavour to overwhelm me.
After having deserved well of my country by my last act, I am not
bound to hear myself accused in a manner as absurd as atrocious.
I have not expected that a manifesto, signed by emigrants, paid by
England, should obtain more credit with the Council of Five Hundred
than the evidence of eighty thousand men—than mine! What! we were
assassinated by traitors—upwards of four hundred men perished; and
the first magistrates of the Republic make it a crime to have
believed the statement for a moment. Upwards of four hundred
Frenchmen were dragged through the streets. They were assassinated
before the eyes of the governor of the fort. They were pierced with
a thousand blows of stilettos, such as I sent you and the
representatives of the French people cause it to be printed, that if
they believed this fact for an instant, they were excusable. I know
well there are societies where it is said, "Is this blood, then, so
pure?"</p>
<p id="id00050" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> If only base men, who are dead to the feeling of patriotism and
national glory, had spoken of me thus, I would not have complained.
I would have disregarded it; but I have a right to complain of the
degradation to which the first magistrates of the Republic reduce
those who have aggrandised, and carried the French name to so high a
pitch of glory. Citizens-Directors, I reiterate the demand I made
for my dismissal; I wish to live in tranquillity, if the poniards of
Clichy will allow me to live. You have employed me in negotiations.
I am not very fit to conduct them.</p>
<p id="id00051" style="margin-top: 2em">About the same time he drew up the following note respecting the affairs
of Venice, which was printed without the author's name, and circulated
through the whole army:—</p>
<h5 id="id00052"> NOTE.</h5>
<p id="id00053" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> Bonaparte, pausing before the gates of Turin, Parma, Rome, and
Vienna, offering peace when he was sure of obtaining nothing but
fresh triumphs—Bonaparte, whose every operation exhibits respect
for religion, morality, and old age; who, instead of heaping, as he
might have done, dishonour upon the Venetians, and humbling their
republic to the earth, loaded her with acts of kindness, and took
such great interest in her glory—is this the same Bonaparte who is
accused of destroying the ancient Government of Venice, and
democratising Genoa, and even of interfering in the affairs of the
prudent and worthy people of the Swiss Cantons? Bonaparte had
passed the Tagliamento, and entered Germany, when insurrections
broke out in the Venetian States; these insurrections were,
therefore, opposed to Bonaparte's project; surely, then, he could
not favour them. When he was in the heart of Germany the Venetians
massacred more than four hundred French troops, drove their quarters
out of Verona, assassinated the unfortunate Laugier, and presented
the spectacle of a fanatical party in arms. He returned to Italy;
and on his arrival, as the winds cease their agitation at the
presence of Neptune, the whole of Italy, which was in commotion,
which was in arms, was restored to order.</p>
<p id="id00054" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> However, the deputies from Bonaparte drew up different articles
conformable to the situation of the country, and in order to
prevent, not a revolution in the Government, for the Government was
defunct, and had died a natural death, but a crisis, and to save the
city from convulsion, anarchy, and pillage. Bonaparte spared a
division of his army to save Venice from pillage and massacre. All
the battalions were in the streets of Venice, the disturbers were
put down, and the pillage discontinued. Property and trade were
preserved, when General Baragney d'Hilliers entered Venice with his
division. Bonaparte, as usual, spared blood, and was the protector
of Venice. Whilst the French troops remained they conducted
themselves peaceably, and only interfered to support the provisional
Government.</p>
<p id="id00055" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> Bonaparte could not say to the deputies of Venice, who came to ask
his protection and assistance against the populace, who wished to
plunder them, "I cannot meddle with your affairs." He could not say
this, for Venice, and all its territories, had really formed the
theatre of war; and, being in the rear of the army of Italy, the
Republic of Venice was really under the jurisdiction of that army.
The rights of war confer upon a general the powers of supreme police
over the countries which are the seat of war. As the great
Frederick said, "There are no neutrals where there is war."
Ignorant advocates and babblers have asked, in the Club of Clichy,
why we occupy the territory of Venice. These declaimers should
learn war, and they would know that the Adige, the Brenta, and the
Tagliamento, where we have been fighting for two years, are within
the Venetian States. But, gentlemen of Clichy, we are at no loss to
perceive your meaning. You reproach the army of Italy for having
surmounted all difficulties—for subduing all Italy for having twice
passed the Alps—for having marched on Vienna, and obliged Austria
to acknowledge the Republic that, you, men of Clichy, would destroy.
You accuse Bonaparte, I see clearly, for having brought about peace.
But I know you, and I speak in the name of eighty thousand soldiers.
The time is gone when base advocates and wretched declaimers could
induce soldiers to revolt. If, however, you compel them, the
soldiers of the army of Italy will soon appear at the Barrier of
Clichy, with their General. But woe unto you if they do!</p>
<p id="id00056" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> Bonaparte having arrived at Palma-Nova, issued a manifesto on the 2d
of May 1797. Arrived at Mestre, where he posted his troops, the
Government sent three deputies to him, with a decree of the Great
Council, without Bonaparte having solicited it and without his
having thought of making any change in the Government of that
country: The governor of Venice was an old man, ninety-nine years of
age, confined by illness to his apartment. Everyone felt the
necessity of renovating this Government of twelve hundred years'
existence, and to simplify its machinery, in order to preserve its
independence, honour, and glory. It was necessary to deliberate,
first, on the manner of renovating the Government; secondly, on the
means of atoning for the massacre of the French, the iniquity of
which every one was sensible..</p>
<p id="id00057" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> Bonaparte, after having received the deputation at Mestre, told them
that in order to obtain satisfaction, for the assassination of his
brethren in arms, he wished the Great Council to arrest the
inquisitors. He afterwards granted them an armistice, and appointed
Milan as the place of conference. The deputies arrived at Milan on
the . . . A negotiation commenced to re-establish harmony between
the Governments. However, anarchy, with all its horrors, afflicted
the city of Venice. Ten thousand Sclavonians threatened to pillage
the shops. Bonaparte acquiesced in the proposition submitted by the
deputies, who promised to verify the loss which had been sustained
by pillage.</p>
<p id="id00058" style="margin-top: 2em">Bonaparte also addressed a manifesto to the Doge, which appeared in all
the public papers. It contained fifteen articles of complaint, and was
followed by a decree ordering the French Minister to leave Venice, the
Venetian agents to leave Lombard, and the Lion of St. Mark to be pulled
down in all the Continental territories of Venice.</p>
<p id="id00059">The General-in-Chief now openly manifested his resolution of marching on
Paris; and this disposition, which was well known in the army, was soon
communicated to Vienna. At this period a letter from the Emperor Francis
II. to his brother, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was intercepted by
Bonaparte. I translated the letter, which proved to him that Francis II.
was acquainted with his project. He likewise saw with pleasure the
assurances which the Emperor gave his brother of his love of peace, as
well as the wavering of the imperial resolves, and the incertitude
respecting the fate of the Italian princes, which the Emperor easily
perceived to depend on Bonaparte. The Emperor's letter was as follows:—</p>
<p id="id00060" style="margin-left: 6%; margin-right: 6%"> MY DEAR BROTHER—I punctually received your third letter, containing
a description of your unhappy and delicate situation. You may be
assured that I perceive it as clearly as you do yourself; and I pity
you the more because, in truth, I do not know what advice to give
you. You are, like me, the victim of the former inactivity of the
princes of Italy, who ought, at once, to have acted with all their
united forces, while I still possessed Mantua. If Bonaparte's
project be, as I learn, to establish republics in Italy, this is
likely to end in spreading republicanism over the whole country. I
have already commenced negotiations for peace, and the preliminaries
are ratified. If the French observe them as strictly as I do, and
will do, then your situation will be improved; but already the
French are beginning to disregard them. The principal problem which
remains to be solved is, whether the French Directory approve of
Bonaparte's proceedings, and whether the latter, as appears by some
papers distributed through his army, is not disposed to revolt
against his country, which also seems to be probable, from his
severe conduct towards Switzerland, notwithstanding the assurances
of the Directory, that he had been ordered to leave the country
untouched. If this should be the case, new and innumerable
difficulties may arise. Under these circumstances I can, at
present, advise nothing; for, as to myself, it is only time and the
circumstances of the moment which can point out how I am to act.</p>
<p id="id00061"> There is nothing new here. We are all well; but the heat is<br/>
extraordinary. Always retain your friendship and love for me.<br/>
Make my compliments to your wife, and believe me ever<br/></p>
<p id="id00062"> Your best Friend and Brother,<br/>
FRANCIS.<br/></p>
<p id="id00063"> HETZENDORF, July 20, 1797.</p>
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