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<h2> SECT. XVI OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS </h2>
<p>Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much
pains to defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that
beasts are endowd with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments
are in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and
ignorant.</p>
<p>We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided
by reason and design, and that it is not ignorantly nor casually we
perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining
pleasure, and avoiding pain. When therefore we see other creatures, in
millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them to the ends,
all our principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible
force to believe the existence of a like cause. It is needless in my
opinion to illustrate this argument by the enumeration of particulars. The
smallest attention will supply us with more than are requisite. The
resemblance betwixt the actions of animals and those of men is so entire
in this respect, that the very first action of the first animal we shall
please to pitch on, will afford us an incontestable argument for the
present doctrine.</p>
<p>This doctrine is as useful as it is obvious, and furnishes us with a kind
of touchstone, by which we may try every system in this species of
philosophy. It is from the resemblance of the external actions of animals
to those we ourselves perform, that we judge their internal likewise to
resemble ours; and the same principle of reasoning, carryd one step
farther, will make us conclude that since our internal actions resemble
each other, the causes, from which they are derivd, must also be
resembling. When any hypothesis, therefore, is advancd to explain a mental
operation, which is common to men and beasts, we must apply the same
hypothesis to both; and as every true hypothesis will abide this trial, so
I may venture to affirm, that no false one will ever be able to endure it.
The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employd to
account for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a
subtility and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of
mere animals, but even of children and the common people in our own
species; who are notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and
affections as persons of the most accomplishd genius and understanding.
Such a subtility is a dear proof of the falshood, as the contrary
simplicity of the truth, of any system.</p>
<p>Let us therefore put our present system concerning the nature of the
understanding to this decisive trial, and see whether it will equally
account for the reasonings of beasts as for these of the human species.</p>
<p>Here we must make a distinction betwixt those actions of animals, which
are of a vulgar nature, and seem to be on a level with their common
capacities, and those more extraordinary instances of sagacity, which they
sometimes discover for their own preservation, and the propagation of
their species. A dog, that avoids fire and precipices, that shuns
strangers, and caresses his master, affords us an instance of the first
kind. A bird, that chooses with such care and nicety the place and
materials of her nest, and sits upon her eggs for a due time, and in
suitable season, with all the precaution that a chymist is capable of in
the most delicate projection, furnishes us with a lively instance of the
second.</p>
<p>As to the former actions, I assert they proceed from a reasoning, that is
not in itself different, nor founded on different principles, from that
which appears in human nature. It is necessary in the first place, that
there be some impression immediately present to their memory or senses, in
order to be the foundation of their judgment. From the tone of voice the
dog infers his masters anger, and foresees his own punishment. From a
certain sensation affecting his smell, he judges his game not to be far
distant from him.</p>
<p>Secondly, The inference he draws from the present impression is built on
experience, and on his observation of the conjunction of objects in past
instances. As you vary this experience, he varies his reasoning. Make a
beating follow upon one sign or motion for some time, and afterwards upon
another; and he will successively draw different conclusions, according to
his most recent experience.</p>
<p>Now let any philosopher make a trial, and endeavour to explain that act of
the mind, which we call BELIEF, and give an account of the principles,
from which it is derivd, independent of the influence of custom on the
imagination, and let his hypothesis be equally applicable to beasts as to
the human species; and after he has done this, I promise to embrace his
opinion. But at the same time I demand as an equitable condition, that if
my system be the only one, which can answer to all these terms, it may be
receivd as entirely satisfactory and convincing. And that it is the only
one, is evident almost without any reasoning. Beasts certainly never
perceive any real connexion among objects. It is therefore by experience
they infer one from another. They can never by any arguments form a
general conclusion, that those objects, of which they have had no
experience, resemble those of which they have. It is therefore by means of
custom alone, that experience operates upon them. All this was
sufficiently evident with respect to man. But with respect to beasts there
cannot be the least suspicion of mistake; which must be ownd to be a
strong confirmation, or rather an invincible proof of my system.</p>
<p>Nothing shews more the force of habit in reconciling us to any
phaenomenoun, than this, that men are not astonished at the operations of
their own reason, at the same time, that they admire the instinct of
animals, and find a difficulty in explaining it, merely because it cannot
be reducd tothe very same principles. To consider the matter aright,
reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our
souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them
with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and
relations. This instinct, it is true, arises from past observation and
experience; but can any one give the ultimate reason, why past experience
and observation produces such an effect, any more than why nature alone
shoud produce it? Nature may certainly produce whatever can arise from
habit: Nay, habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and
derives all its force from that origin.</p>
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