<h2>CHAPTER XL.</h2>
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<h3>FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON—GENERAL ROSECRANS—COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI— ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS—ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.</h3>
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<p>The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo,
announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the
17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the Galt House,
Louisville, where I would meet an officer of the War Department
with my instructions. I left Cairo within an hour or two after the
receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis. Just as
the train I was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis a
messenger came running up to stop it, saying the Secretary of War
was coming into the station and wanted to see me.</p>
<p>I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held
frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when I was
in Tennessee. Occasionally at night he would order the wires
between the War Department and my headquarters to be connected, and
we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion
the Secretary was accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I
had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances.
Mr. Stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to
Indianapolis, and accompanied me to Louisville.</p>
<p>Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted
after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's
dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the
operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we
started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying that I might
take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one
particular. Both created the "Military Division of Mississippi,"
(giving me the command) composed of the Departments of the Ohio,
the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the
Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of Banks's command in
the south-west. One order left the department commanders as they
were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his
place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville after night
and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The
Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that
occasion from which he never expected to recover. He never did.</p>
<p>A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the
military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment
at the results of some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day
after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I
left the hotel to spend the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was
with me) and myself having relatives living in Louisville. In the
course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C.
A. Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented
Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his
doing so.</p>
<p>As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly
upon the government the propriety of a movement against Mobile.
General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a
large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with
Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first,
considering it was on the defensive. But after the investment of
Vicksburg Bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston,
in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. I
frequently wrote General Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should
move against Bragg. By so doing he would either detain the latter's
troops where they were or lay Chattanooga open to capture. General
Halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that
he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter
had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after
having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a
military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same
time." If true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. It would
be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day,
but it would not be bad to win them. I, however, was fighting no
battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans' front
so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater
than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when
these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to move
against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.
Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards
Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to
return.</p>
<p>It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief
the movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the
Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary
casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its
constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the
enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. Mobile was
important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force
was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened by land
and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or
troops would have to be sent to its defence. Those troops would
necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment was overruled, and the
troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the
country where it was thought they could render the most
service.</p>
<p>Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in
trouble and required assistance. The emergency was now too
immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack
in rear of Bragg upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary to
reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available
point.</p>
<p>Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the
Tennessee River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had
stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would
have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially
compensated. But he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered,
until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg
took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was
able to get his army together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east
of Chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. The battle
was fought on the 19th and 20th of September, and Rosecrans was
badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen
thousand men killed, wounded and captured. The corps under
Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans,
with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas
returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg
followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking
Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town,
which Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river
and the river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops
were now strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the
Tennessee River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding
heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley
from mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large
part of the way, in front of their line.</p>
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<p>On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and
directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to
be sent to Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received
Sherman was on his way, and McPherson was moving east with most of
the garrison of Vicksburg.</p>
<p>A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It
would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic
position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of
all the artillery still left with the Army of the Cumberland and
the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or
demoralization.</p>
<p>All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The
railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the
government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to
the south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout
and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad,
the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and
north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The
distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail,
but owing to the position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had
to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a
mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty
miles.</p>
<p>This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly
ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left
to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to
convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for
a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven
from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became
so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached
Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left
alive there—"on the lift." Indeed, the beef was so poor that
the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint
facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard bread
and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."</p>
<p>Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were
without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the
advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the
Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There
were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was
abundant. The only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my
arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a
considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it
down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within
our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It would then be carried
on the shoulders of the men to their camps.</p>
<p>If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that
any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized
body, if followed by the enemy.</p>
<p>On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me.
Finding that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of
every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they
knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at
once. About eleven o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way,
when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the
Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. I
hastened to the room of the Secretary and found him pacing the
floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. Saying that the retreat must be
prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I immediately wrote an order
assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and
telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I then telegraphed to him the
order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the Army
of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at
all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would be at the
front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from Thomas,
saying, "We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciated the
force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of
affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courses
were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be
captured.</p>
<p>On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff,
and proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent
to travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville
until the next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew
Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of
welcome. His composure showed that it was by no means his maiden
effort. It was long, and I was in torture while he was delivering
it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. I was
relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard
enough. At all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which,
although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to
me in this emergency.</p>
<p>From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at
Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be
fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men;
to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed
Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from
St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to
send a gunboat to convoy them; and to Thomas, suggesting that large
parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to
Bridgeport.</p>
<p>On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front,
reaching Stevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his
way north. He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in
which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and
made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only
wonder was that he had not carried them out. We then proceeded to
Bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. From here we took
horses and made our way by Jasper and over Waldron's Ridge to
Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the roads were almost
impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the
mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the time of my fall in
New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not
safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the debris
of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules
and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport,
there was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there.
From this point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to
secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and
small-arms. We stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or
twelve miles farther on. The next day we reached Chattanooga a
little before dark. I went directly to General Thomas's
headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until I could
establish my own.</p>
<p>During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay
their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They
pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil,
which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them
had approved the move they did not say so to me. I found General W.
F. Smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the Army of
the Cumberland. I had known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had
no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up
to this time. He explained the situation of the two armies and the
topography of the country so plainly that I could see it without an
inspection. I found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks
of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood;
and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had
got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a
second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. He was also
rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a
third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way a steamer
for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we might get
possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scow, made of the
plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached
which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or
factory.</p>
<p>I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General
Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned
to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the
field. The request was at once complied with.</p>
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