<SPAN name="startofbook"></SPAN>
<h1>HISTORY</h1>
<h4>OF THE</h4>
<h1>UNITED STATES</h1>
<h3>BY</h3>
<h2>CHARLES A. BEARD</h2>
<h4>AND</h4>
<h2>MARY R. BEARD</h2>
<hr style="width: 65%;" />
<hr style="width: 65%;" />
<h2>CONTENTS</h2>
<div class='center'>
<table border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0" summary="Contents">
<tr><td align='left'></td><td align='center'>PART I. THE COLONIAL PERIOD</td></tr>
<tr><td align='right'><span class="smcap">chapter</span></td><td align='left'></td><td align='right'>
<span class="smcap">page</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='center'><br/><br/>PART VII. PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD WAR<br/></td></tr>
<tr><td align='right'>XXI.</td>
<td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Evolution of Republican Policies</span>(1901-1913)</td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_507'>507</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Foreign Affairs</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_508'>508</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Colonial Administration</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_515'>515</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The Roosevelt Domestic Policies</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_519'>519</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Legislative and Executive Activities</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_523'>523</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The Administration of President Taft</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_527'>527</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Progressive Insurgency and the Election of 1912</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_530'>530</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='right'>XXII.</td>
<td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Spirit of Reform in America</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_536'>536</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">An Age of Criticism</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_536'>536</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Political Reforms</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_538'>538</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Measures of Economic Reform</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_546'>546</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='right'>XXIII.</td>
<td align='left'><span class="smcap">The New Political Democracy</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_554'>554</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The Rise of the Woman Movement</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_555'>555</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The National Struggle for Woman Suffrage</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_562'>562</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='right'>XXIV.</td>
<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Industrial Democracy</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_570'>570</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Coöperation between Employers and Employees</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_571'>571</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The Rise and Growth of Organized Labor</span>
</td><td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_575'>575</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The Wider Relations of Organized Labor</span>
</td><td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_577'>577</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Immigration and Americanization</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_582'>582</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='right'>XXV.</td>
<td align='left'><span class="smcap">President Wilson and the World War</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_588'>588</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Domestic Legislation</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_588'>588</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Colonial and Foreign Policies</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_592'>592</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The United States and the European War</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_596'>596</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The United States at War</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_604'>604</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">The Settlement at Paris</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_612'>612</SPAN></td></tr>
<tr><td align='left'></td>
<td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 5em;">Summary of Democracy and the World War</span></td>
<td align='right'><SPAN href='#Page_620'>620</SPAN></td></tr>
</table></div>
<hr style="width: 65%;" />
<h2>PART VII. PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD WAR</h2>
<hr style="width: 65%;" />
<h2>CHAPTER XXI</h2>
<h3>THE EVOLUTION OF REPUBLICAN POLICIES (1901-13)</h3>
<p><b>The Personality and Early Career of Roosevelt.</b>—On September 14, 1901,
when Theodore Roosevelt took the oath of office, the presidency passed
to a new generation and a leader of a new type recalling, if comparisons
must be made, Andrew Jackson rather than any Republican predecessor.
Roosevelt was brusque, hearty, restless, and fond of action—"a young
fellow of infinite dash and originality," as John Hay remarked of him;
combining the spirit of his old college, Harvard, with the breezy
freedom of the plains; interested in everything—a new species of game,
a new book, a diplomatic riddle, or a novel theory of history or
biology. Though only forty-three years old he was well versed in the art
of practical politics. Coming upon the political scene in the early
eighties, he had associated himself with the reformers in the Republican
party; but he was no Mugwump. From the first he vehemently preached the
doctrine of party loyalty; if beaten in the convention, he voted the
straight ticket in the election. For twenty years he adhered to this
rule and during a considerable portion of that period he held office as
a spokesman of his party. He served in the New York legislature, as head
of the metropolitan police force, as federal civil service commissioner
under President Harrison, as assistant secretary of the navy under
President McKinley, and as governor of the Empire state. Political
managers of the old school spoke of him as "brilliant but erratic"; they
soon found him equal to the shrewdest in negotiation and action.<SPAN name="Page_508" id="Page_508"></SPAN></p>
<div><SPAN name="engineer" id="engineer" /></div>
<div class="figcenter"><SPAN href="./images/542.jpg"><ANTIMG src="./images/542-tb.jpg" alt="Roosevelt Talking to the Engineer of a Railroad Train" title="Roosevelt Talking to the Engineer of a Railroad Train" /></SPAN></div>
<div class='caption'><i><small>Copyright by Underwood and Underwood, N.Y.</small></i><br/>
<span class="smcap">Roosevelt Talking to the Engineer of a Railroad Train</span></div>
<h3><span class="smcap">Foreign Affairs</span></h3>
<p><b>The Panama Canal.</b>—The most important foreign question confronting
President Roosevelt on the day of his inauguration, that of the Panama
Canal, was a heritage from his predecessor. The idea of a water route
across the isthmus, <SPAN name="Page_509" id="Page_509"></SPAN>long a dream of navigators, had become a living
issue after the historic voyage of the battleship <i>Oregon</i> around South
America during the Spanish War. But before the United States could act
it had to undo the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, made with Great Britain in
1850, providing for the construction of the canal under joint
supervision. This was finally effected by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of
1901 authorizing the United States to proceed alone, on condition that
there should be no discriminations against other nations in the matter
of rates and charges.</p>
<p>This accomplished, it was necessary to decide just where the canal
should be built. One group in Congress favored the route through
Nicaragua; in fact, two official commissions had already approved that
location. Another group favored cutting the way through Panama after
purchasing the rights of the old French company which, under the
direction of De Lesseps, the hero of the Suez Canal, had made a costly
failure some twenty years before. After a heated argument over the
merits of the two plans, preference was given to the Panama route. As
the isthmus was then a part of Colombia, President Roosevelt proceeded
to negotiate with the government at Bogota a treaty authorizing the
United States to cut a canal through its territory. The treaty was
easily framed, but it was rejected by the Colombian senate, much to the
President's exasperation. "You could no more make an agreement with the
Colombian rulers," he exclaimed, "than you could nail jelly to a wall."
He was spared the necessity by a timely revolution. On November 3, 1903,
Panama renounced its allegiance to Colombia and three days later the
United States recognized its independence.</p>
<div><SPAN name="canal" id="canal" /></div>
<div class="figcenter"><SPAN href="./images/544.jpg"><ANTIMG src="./images/544-tb.jpg" alt="Panama Canal" title="Panama Canal" /></SPAN></div>
<div class='caption'><i><small>Courtesy of Panama Canal, Washington, D.C.</small></i><br/>
<span class="smcap">Deepest Excavated Portion of Panama Canal, Showing Gold Hill on
Right and Contractor's Hill on Left. June, 1913</span></div>
<p>This amazing incident was followed shortly by the signature of a treaty
between Panama and the United States in which the latter secured the
right to construct the long-discussed canal, in return for a guarantee
of independence and certain cash payments. The rights and property of
the French concern were then bought, and the final details settled. A
lock <SPAN name="Page_510" id="Page_510"></SPAN>rather than a sea-level canal was agreed upon. Construction by the
government directly instead of by private contractors was adopted.
Scientific medicine was summoned to stamp out the tropical diseases that
had made Panama a plague spot. Finally, in 1904, as the President said,
"the dirt began to fly." After surmounting formidable
difficulties—engineering, labor, and sanitary—the American forces in
1913 joined the waters of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Nearly eight
thousand miles were cut off the sea voyage from New York to San
Francisco. If any were inclined to criticize<SPAN name="Page_511" id="Page_511"></SPAN> President Roosevelt for
the way in which he snapped off negotiations with Colombia and
recognized the Panama revolutionists, their attention was drawn to the
magnificent outcome of the affair. Notwithstanding the treaty with Great
Britain, Congress passed a tolls bill discriminating in rates in favor
of American ships. It was only on the urgent insistence of President
Wilson that the measure was later repealed.</p>
<p><b>The Conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War.</b>—The applause which greeted
the President's next diplomatic stroke was unmarred by censure of any
kind. In the winter of 1904 there broke out between Japan and Russia a
terrible conflict over the division of spoils in Manchuria. The fortunes
of war were with the agile forces of Nippon. In this struggle, it seems,
President Roosevelt's sympathies were mainly with the Japanese, although
he observed the proprieties of neutrality. At all events, Secretary Hay
wrote in his diary on New Year's Day, 1905, that the President was
"quite firm in his view that we cannot permit Japan to be robbed a
second time of her victory," referring to the fact that Japan, ten years
before, after defeating China on the field of battle, had been forced by
Russia, Germany, and France to forego the fruits of conquest.</p>
<p>Whatever the President's personal feelings may have been, he was aware
that Japan, despite her triumphs over Russia, was staggering under a
heavy burden of debt. At a suggestion from Tokyo, he invited both
belligerents in the summer of 1905 to join in a peace conference. The
celerity of their reply was aided by the pressure of European bankers,
who had already come to a substantial agreement that the war must stop.
After some delay, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was chosen as the meeting
place for the spokesmen of the two warring powers. Roosevelt presided
over the opening ceremonies with fine urbanity, thoroughly enjoying the
justly earned honor of being for the moment at the center of the world's
interest. He had the satisfaction of seeing the conference end in a
treaty of peace and amity.<SPAN name="Page_512" id="Page_512"></SPAN></p>
<p><b>The Monroe Doctrine Applied to Germany.</b>—Less spectacular than the
Russo-Japanese settlement but not less important was a diplomatic
passage-at-arms with Germany over the Monroe Doctrine. This clash grew
out of the inability or unwillingness of the Venezuelan government to
pay debts due foreign creditors. Having exhausted their patience in
negotiations, England and Germany, in December 1901, sent battleships to
establish what they characterized as "a peaceful blockade" of Venezuelan
ports. Their action was followed by the rupture of diplomatic relations;
there was a possibility that war and the occupation of Venezuelan
territory might result.</p>
<p>While unwilling to stand between a Latin-American country and its
creditors, President Roosevelt was determined that debt collecting
should not be made an excuse for European countries to seize territory.
He therefore urged arbitration of the dispute, winning the assent of
England and Italy. Germany, with a somewhat haughty air, refused to take
the milder course. The President, learning of this refusal, called the
German ambassador to the White House and informed him in very precise
terms that, unless the Imperial German Government consented to
arbitrate, Admiral Dewey would be ordered to the scene with instructions
to prevent Germany from seizing any Venezuelan territory. A week passed
and no answer came from Berlin. Not baffled, the President again took
the matter up with the ambassador, this time with even more firmness; he
stated in language admitting of but one meaning that, unless within
forty-eight hours the Emperor consented to arbitration, American
battleships, already coaled and cleared, would sail for Venezuelan
waters. The hint was sufficient. The Kaiser accepted the proposal and
the President, with the fine irony of diplomacy, complimented him
publicly on "being so stanch an advocate of arbitration." In terms of
the Monroe Doctrine this action meant that the United States, while not
denying the obligations of debtors, would not permit any move on the
part of European powers that <SPAN name="Page_513" id="Page_513"></SPAN>might easily lead to the temporary or
permanent occupation of Latin-American territory.</p>
<p><b>The Santo Domingo Affair.</b>—The same issue was involved in a
controversy over Santo Domingo which arose in 1904. The Dominican
republic, like Venezuela, was heavily in debt, and certain European
countries declared that, unless the United States undertook to look
after the finances of the embarrassed debtor, they would resort to armed
coercion. What was the United States to do? The danger of having some
European power strongly intrenched in Santo Domingo was too imminent to
be denied. President Roosevelt acted with characteristic speed, and
notwithstanding strong opposition in the Senate was able, in 1907, to
effect a treaty arrangement which placed Dominican finances under
American supervision.</p>
<p>In the course of the debate over this settlement, a number of
interesting questions arose. It was pertinently asked whether the
American navy should be used to help creditors collect their debts
anywhere in Latin-America. It was suggested also that no sanction should
be given to the practice among European governments of using armed force
to collect private claims. Opponents of President Roosevelt's policy,
and they were neither few nor insignificant, urged that such matters
should be referred to the Hague Court or to special international
commissions for arbitration. To this the answer was made that the United
States could not surrender any question coming under the terms of the
Monroe Doctrine to the decision of an international tribunal. The
position of the administration was very clearly stated by President
Roosevelt himself. "The country," he said, "would certainly decline to
go to war to prevent a foreign government from collecting a just debt;
on the other hand, it is very inadvisable to permit any foreign power to
take possession, even temporarily, of the customs houses of an American
republic in order to enforce the payment of its obligations; for such a
temporary occupation might turn into a permanent occupation. The only
escape <SPAN name="Page_514" id="Page_514"></SPAN>from these alternatives may at any time be that we must
ourselves undertake to bring about some arrangement by which so much as
possible of a just obligation shall be paid." The Monroe Doctrine was
negative. It denied to European powers a certain liberty of operation in
this hemisphere. The positive obligations resulting from its application
by the United States were points now emphasized and developed.</p>
<p><b>The Hague Conference.</b>—The controversies over Latin-American relations
and his part in bringing the Russo-Japanese War to a close naturally
made a deep impression upon Roosevelt, turning his mind in the direction
of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The subject was
moreover in the air. As if conscious of impending calamity, the
statesmen of the Old World, to all outward signs at least, seemed
searching for a way to reduce armaments and avoid the bloody and costly
trial of international causes by the ancient process of battle. It was
the Czar, Nicholas II, fated to die in one of the terrible holocausts
which he helped to bring upon mankind, who summoned the delegates of the
nations in the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899. The conference did
nothing to reduce military burdens or avoid wars but it did recognize
the right of friendly nations to offer the services of mediation to
countries at war and did establish a Court at the Hague for the
arbitration of international disputes.</p>
<p>Encouraged by this experiment, feeble as it was, President Roosevelt in
1904 proposed a second conference, yielding to the Czar the honor of
issuing the call. At this great international assembly, held at the
Hague in 1907, the representatives of the United States proposed a plan
for the compulsory arbitration of certain matters of international
dispute. This was rejected with contempt by Germany. Reduction of
armaments, likewise proposed in the conference, was again deferred. In
fact, nothing was accomplished beyond agreement upon certain rules for
the conduct of "civilized warfare," casting a somewhat lurid light upon
the "pacific" intentions of most of the powers assembled.<SPAN name="Page_515" id="Page_515"></SPAN></p>
<p><b>The World Tour of the Fleet.</b>—As if to assure the world then that the
United States placed little reliance upon the frail reed of peace
conferences, Roosevelt the following year (1908) made an imposing
display of American naval power by sending a fleet of sixteen
battleships on a tour around the globe. On his own authority, he ordered
the ships to sail out of Hampton Roads and circle the earth by way of
the Straits of Magellan, San Francisco, Australia, the Philippines,
China, Japan, and the Suez Canal. This enterprise was not, as some
critics claimed, a "mere boyish flourish." President Roosevelt knew how
deep was the influence of sea power on the fate of nations. He was aware
that no country could have a wide empire of trade and dominion without
force adequate to sustain it. The voyage around the world therefore
served a double purpose. It interested his own country in the naval
program of the government, and it reminded other powers that the
American giant, though quiet, was not sleeping in the midst of
international rivalries.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Colonial Administration</span></h3>
<p><b>A Constitutional Question Settled.</b>—In colonial administration, as in
foreign policy, President Roosevelt advanced with firm step in a path
already marked out. President McKinley had defined the principles that
were to control the development of Porto Rico and the Philippines. The
Republican party had announced a program of pacification, gradual
self-government, and commercial improvement. The only remaining question
of importance, to use the popular phrase,—"Does the Constitution follow
the flag?"—had been answered by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Although it was well known that the Constitution did not contemplate the
government of dependencies, such as the Philippines and Porto Rico, the
Court, by generous and ingenious interpretations, found a way for
Congress to apply any reasonable rules required by the occasion.</p>
<div><SPAN name="sugar" id="sugar" /></div>
<div class="figcenter"><SPAN href="./images/550.jpg"><ANTIMG src="./images/550-tb.jpg" alt="A Sugar Mill, Porto Rico" title="A Sugar Mill, Porto Rico" /></SPAN></div>
<div class='caption'><i><small>Photograph from Underwood and Underwood, N.Y.</small></i><br/>
<span class="smcap">A Sugar Mill, Porto Rico</span></div>
<p><b>Porto Rico.</b>—The government of Porto Rico was a relatively simple
matter. It was a single island with a fairly homogeneous <SPAN name="Page_516" id="Page_516"></SPAN>population
apart from the Spanish upper class. For a time after military occupation
in 1898, it was administered under military rule. This was succeeded by
the establishment of civil government under the "organic act" passed by
Congress in 1900. The law assured to the Porto Ricans American
protection but withheld American citizenship—a boon finally granted in
1917. It provided for a governor and six executive secretaries appointed
by the President with the approval of the Senate; and for a legislature
of two houses—one elected by popular native vote, and an upper chamber
composed of the executive secretaries and five other persons appointed
in the same manner. Thus the United States turned back to the provincial
system maintained by England in Virginia or New York in old colonial
days. The natives were given a voice in their government and the power
of initiating laws; but the final word both in law-making and
administration was vested in officers appointed in Washington. Such was
the plan under which the affairs of Porto Rico were conducted by
President Roosevelt. It lasted until the new organic act of 1917.</p>
<p><b>The Philippines.</b>—The administration of the Philippines presented far
more difficult questions. The number of islands, <SPAN name="Page_517" id="Page_517"></SPAN>the variety of
languages and races, the differences in civilization all combined to
challenge the skill of the government. Moreover, there was raging in
1901 a stubborn revolt against American authority, which had to be
faced. Following the lines laid down by President McKinley, the
evolution of<SPAN name="Page_518" id="Page_518"></SPAN> American policy fell into three stages. At first the
islands were governed directly by the President under his supreme
military power. In 1901 a civilian commission, headed by William Howard
Taft, was selected by the President and charged with the government of
the provinces in which order had been restored. Six years later, under
the terms of an organic act, passed by Congress in 1902, the third stage
was reached. The local government passed into the hands of a governor
and commission, appointed by the President and Senate, and a
legislature—one house elected by popular vote and an upper chamber
composed of the commission. This scheme, like that obtaining in Porto
Rico, remained intact until a Democratic Congress under President
Wilson's leadership carried the colonial administration into its fourth
phase by making both houses elective. Thus, by the steady pursuit of a
liberal policy, self-government was extended to the dependencies; but it
encouraged rather than extinguished the vigorous movement among the
Philippine natives for independence.</p>
<div><SPAN name="taft" id="taft" /></div>
<div class="figcenter"><SPAN href="./images/551.jpg"><ANTIMG src="./images/551-tb.jpg" alt="Mr Taft in the Philippines" title="Mr Taft in the Philippines" /></SPAN></div>
<div class='caption'><i><small>Copyright by Underwood and Underwood, N.Y.</small></i><br/>
<span class="smcap">Mr Taft in the Philippines</span></div>
<p><b>Cuban Relations.</b>—Within the
sphere of colonial affairs, Cuba, though nominally independent, also
presented problems to the government at Washington. In the fine
enthusiasm that accompanied the declaration of war on Spain, Congress,
unmindful of practical considerations, recognized the independence of
Cuba and disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the
pacification thereof." In the settlement that followed the war, however,
it was deemed undesirable to set the young republic adrift upon the
stormy sea of international politics without a guiding hand. Before
withdrawing American troops from the island, Congress, in March, 1901,
enacted, and required Cuba to approve, a series of restrictions known as
the Platt amendment, limiting her power to incur indebtedness, securing
the right of the United States to intervene whenever necessary to
protect life and property, and reserving to the United States coaling
stations at certain points to be agreed upon. The Cubans made strong
protests against what they <SPAN name="Page_519" id="Page_519"></SPAN>deemed "infringements of their sovereignty";
but finally with good grace accepted their fate. Even when in 1906
President Roosevelt landed American troops in the island to quell a
domestic dissension, they acquiesced in the action, evidently regarding
it as a distinct warning that they should learn to manage their
elections in an orderly manner.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Roosevelt Domestic Policies</span></h3>
<p><b>Social Questions to the Front.</b>—From the day of his inauguration to
the close of his service in 1909, President Roosevelt, in messages,
speeches, and interviews, kept up a lively and interesting discussion of
trusts, capital, labor, poverty, riches, lawbreaking, good citizenship,
and kindred themes. Many a subject previously touched upon only by
representatives of the minor and dissenting parties, he dignified by a
careful examination. That he did this with any fixed design or policy in
mind does not seem to be the case. He admitted himself that when he
became President he did not have in hand any settled or far-reaching
plan of social betterment. He did have, however, serious convictions on
general principles. "I was bent upon making the government," he wrote,
"the most efficient possible instrument in helping the people of the
United States to better themselves in every way, politically, socially,
and industrially. I believed with all my heart in real and
thorough-going democracy and I wished to make the democracy industrial
as well as political, although I had only partially formulated the
method I believed we should follow." It is thus evident at least that he
had departed a long way from the old idea of the government as nothing
but a great policeman keeping order among the people in a struggle over
the distribution of the nation's wealth and resources.</p>
<p><b>Roosevelt's View of the Constitution.</b>—Equally significant was
Roosevelt's attitude toward the Constitution and the office of
President. He utterly repudiated the narrow construction of our national
charter. He held that the Constitution "should be treated as the
greatest document ever devised by the wit of <SPAN name="Page_520" id="Page_520"></SPAN>man to aid a people in
exercising every power necessary for its own betterment, not as a
strait-jacket cunningly fashioned to strangle growth." He viewed the
presidency as he did the Constitution. Strict constructionists of the
Jeffersonian school, of whom there were many on occasion even in the
Republican party, had taken a view that the President could do nothing
that he was not specifically authorized by the Constitution to do.
Roosevelt took exactly the opposite position. It was his opinion that it
was not only the President's right but his duty "to do anything that the
needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws." He went on to say that he acted "for the
common well-being of all our people whenever and in whatever manner was
necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative
prohibition."</p>
<p><b>The Trusts and Railways.</b>—To the trust question, Roosevelt devoted
especial attention. This was unavoidable. By far the larger part of the
business of the country was done by corporations as distinguished from
partnerships and individual owners. The growth of these gigantic
aggregations of capital had been the leading feature in American
industrial development during the last two decades of the nineteenth
century. In the conquest of business by trusts and "the resulting
private fortunes of great magnitude," the Populists and the Democrats
had seen a grievous danger to the republic. "Plutocracy has taken the
place of democracy; the tariff breeds trusts; let us destroy therefore
the tariff and the trusts"—such was the battle cry which had been taken
up by Bryan and his followers.</p>
<p>President Roosevelt countered vigorously. He rejected the idea that the
trusts were the product of the tariff or of governmental action of any
kind. He insisted that they were the outcome of "natural economic
forces": (1) destructive competition among business men compelling them
to avoid ruin by coöperation in fixing prices; (2) the growth of markets
on a national scale and even international scale calling for vast
accumulations of capital to carry on such business; (3) the possibil<SPAN name="Page_521" id="Page_521"></SPAN>ity
of immense savings by the union of many plants under one management. In
the corporation he saw a new stage in the development of American
industry. Unregulated competition he regarded as "the source of evils
which all men concede must be remedied if this civilization of ours is
to survive." The notion, therefore, that these immense business concerns
should be or could be broken up by a decree of law, Roosevelt considered
absurd.</p>
<p>At the same time he proposed that "evil trusts" should be prevented from
"wrong-doing of any kind"; that is, punished for plain swindling, for
making agreements to limit output, for refusing to sell to customers who
dealt with rival firms, and for conspiracies with railways to ruin
competitors by charging high freight rates and for similar abuses.
Accordingly, he proposed, not the destruction of the trusts, but their
regulation by the government. This, he contended, would preserve the
advantages of business on a national scale while preventing the evils
that accompanied it. The railway company he declared to be a public
servant. "Its rates should be just to and open to all shippers alike."
So he answered those who thought that trusts and railway combinations
were private concerns to be managed solely by their owners without let
or hindrance and also those who thought trusts and railway combinations
could be abolished by tariff reduction or criminal prosecution.</p>
<p><b>The Labor Question.</b>—On the labor question, then pressing to the front
in public interest, President Roosevelt took advanced ground for his
time. He declared that the working-man, single-handed and empty-handed,
threatened with starvation if unemployed, was no match for the employer
who was able to bargain and wait. This led him, accordingly, to accept
the principle of the trade union; namely, that only by collective
bargaining can labor be put on a footing to measure its strength equally
with capital. While he severely arraigned labor leaders who advocated
violence and destructive doctrines, he held that "the organization of
labor into trade unions and federations is necessary, is beneficent, and
is one of the greatest <SPAN name="Page_522" id="Page_522"></SPAN>possible agencies in the attainment of a true
industrial, as well as a true political, democracy in the United
States." The last resort of trade unions in labor disputes, the strike,
he approved in case negotiations failed to secure "a fair deal."</p>
<p>He thought, however, that labor organizations, even if wisely managed,
could not solve all the pressing social questions of the time. The aid
of the government at many points he believed to be necessary to
eliminate undeserved poverty, industrial diseases, unemployment, and the
unfortunate consequences of industrial accidents. In his first message
of 1901, for instance, he urged that workers injured in industry should
have certain and ample compensation. From time to time he advocated
other legislation to obtain what he called "a larger measure of social
and industrial justice."</p>
<p><b>Great Riches and Taxation.</b>—Even the challenge of the radicals, such
as the Populists, who alleged that "the toil of millions is boldly
stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few"—challenges which his
predecessors did not consider worthy of notice—President Roosevelt
refused to let pass without an answer. In his first message he denied
the truth of the common saying that the rich were growing richer and the
poor were growing poorer. He asserted that, on the contrary, the average
man, wage worker, farmer, and small business man, was better off than
ever before in the history of our country. That there had been abuses in
the accumulation of wealth he did not pretend to ignore, but he believed
that even immense fortunes, on the whole, represented positive benefits
conferred upon the country. Nevertheless he felt that grave dangers to
the safety and the happiness of the people lurked in great inequalities
of wealth. In 1906 he wrote that he wished it were in his power to
prevent the heaping up of enormous fortunes. The next year, to the
astonishment of many leaders in his own party, he boldly announced in a
message to Congress that he approved both income and inheritance taxes,
then generally viewed as Populist or Democratic measures. He even took
the stand that such taxes should be laid in order to bring about a more
equitable <SPAN name="Page_523" id="Page_523"></SPAN>distribution of wealth and greater equality of opportunity
among citizens.</p>
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