<h2 id="id00086" style="margin-top: 4em">CHAPTER V</h2>
<h5 id="id00087">PEACE WITHOUT HONOUR</h5>
<p id="id00088">The war was brought to a virtual termination by the
surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown on October 19, 1781.
The definitive articles of peace were signed at Versailles
on September 3, 1783. During the two years that intervened
between these events, the lot of the Loyalists was one
of gloomy uncertainty. They found it hard to believe that
the British government would abandon them to the mercy
of their enemies; and yet the temper of the revolutionists
toward them continued such that there seemed little hope
of concession or conciliation. Success had not taught
the rebels the grace of forgiveness. At the capitulation
of Yorktown, Washington had refused to treat with the
Loyalists in Cornwallis's army on the same terms as with
the British regulars; and Cornwallis had been compelled
to smuggle his Loyalist levies out of Yorktown on the
ship that carried the news of his surrender to New York.
As late as 1782 fresh confiscation laws had been passed
in Georgia and the Carolinas; and in New York a law had
been passed cancelling all debts due to Loyalists, on
condition that one-fortieth of the debt was paid into
the state treasury. These were straws which showed the
way the wind was blowing.</p>
<p id="id00089">In the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Versailles
there were no clauses so long and bitterly discussed as
those relating to the Loyalists. The British commissioners
stood out at first for the principle of complete amnesty
to them and restitution of all they had lost; and it is
noteworthy that the French minister added his plea to
theirs. But Benjamin Franklin and his colleagues refused
to agree to this formula. They took the ground that they,
as the representatives merely of the Continental Congress,
had not the right to bind the individual states in such
a matter. The argument was a quibble. Their real reason
was that they were well aware that public opinion in
America would not support them in such a concession. A
few enlightened men in America, such as John Adams,
favoured a policy of compensation to the Loyalists, 'how
little soever they deserve it, nay, how much soever they
deserve the contrary'; but the attitude of the great
majority of the Americans had been clearly demonstrated
by a resolution passed in the legislature of Virginia on
December 17, 1782, to the effect that all demands for
the restitution of confiscated property were wholly
inadmissible. Even some of the Loyalists had begun to
realize that a revolution which had touched property was
bound to be permanent, and that the American commissioners
could no more give back to them their confiscated lands
than Charles II was able to give back to his father's
cavaliers the estates they had lost in the Civil War.</p>
<p id="id00090">The American commissioners agreed, finally, that no future
confiscations should take place, that imprisoned Loyalists
should be released, that no further persecutions should
be permitted, and that creditors on either side should
'meet with no lawful impediment' to the recovery of all
good debts in sterling money. But with regard to the
British demand for restitution, all they could be induced
to sign was a promise that Congress would 'earnestly
recommend to the legislatures of the respective states'
a policy of amnesty and restitution.</p>
<p id="id00091">In making this last recommendation, it is difficult not
to convict the American commissioners of something very
like hypocrisy. There seems to be no doubt that they knew
the recommendation would not be complied with; and little
or no attempt was made by them to persuade the states to
comply with it. In after years the clause was represented
by the Americans as a mere form of words, necessary to
bring the negotiations to an end, and to save the face
of the British government. To this day it has remained,
except in one or two states, a dead letter. On the other
hand it is impossible not to convict the British
commissioners of a betrayal of the Loyalists. 'Never,'
said Lord North in the House of Commons, 'never was the
honour, the humanity, the principles, the policy of a
nation so grossly abused, as in the desertion of those
men who are now exposed to every punishment that desertion
and poverty can inflict, because they were not rebels.'
'In ancient or in modern history,' said Lord Loughborough
in the House of Lords, 'there cannot be found an instance
of so shameful a desertion of men who have sacrificed
all to their duty and to their reliance upon our faith.'
It seems probable that the British commissioners could
have obtained, on paper at any rate, better terms for
the Loyalists. It is very doubtful if the Americans would
have gone to war again over such a question. In 1783 the
position of Great Britain was relatively not weaker, but
stronger, than in 1781, when hostilities had ceased. The
attitude of the French minister, and the state of the
French finances, made it unlikely that France would lend
her support to further hostilities. And there is no doubt
that the American states were even more sorely in need
of peace than was Great Britain.</p>
<p id="id00092">When the terms of peace were announced, great was the
bitterness among the Loyalists. One of them protested in
<i>Rivington's Gazette</i> that 'even robbers, murderers, and
rebels are faithful to their fellows and never betray
each other,' and another sang,</p>
<p id="id00093"> 'Tis an honour to serve the bravest of nations,<br/>
And be left to be hanged in their capitulations.<br/></p>
<p id="id00094">If the terms of the peace had been observed, the plight
of the Loyalists would have been bad enough. But as it
was, the outcome proved even worse. Every clause in the
treaty relating to the Loyalists was broken over and over
again. There was no sign of an abatement of the popular
feeling against them; indeed, in some places, the spirit
of persecution seemed to blaze out anew. One of Washington's
bitterest sayings was uttered at this time, when he said
of the Loyalists that 'he could see nothing better for
them than to commit suicide.' Loyalist creditors found
it impossible to recover their debts in America, while
they were themselves sued in the British courts by their
American creditors, and their property was still being
confiscated by the American legislatures. The legislature
of New York publicly declined to reverse its policy of
confiscation, on the ground that Great Britain had offered
no compensation for the property which her friends had
destroyed. Loyalists who ventured to return home under
the treaty of peace were insulted, tarred and feathered,
whipped, and even ham-strung. All over the country there
were formed local committees or associations with the
object of preventing renewed intercourse with the Loyalists
and the restitution of Loyalist property. 'The proceedings
of these people,' wrote Sir Guy Carleton, 'are not to be
attributed to politics aloneāit serves as a pretence,
and under that cloak they act more boldly, but avarice
and a desire of rapine are the great incentives.'</p>
<p id="id00095">The Loyalists were even denied civil rights in most of
the states. In 1784 an act was passed in New York declaring
that all who had held office under the British, or helped
to fit out vessels of war, or who had served as privates
or officers in the British Army, or who had left the
state, were guilty of 'misprision of treason,' and were
disqualified from both the franchise and public office.
There was in fact hardly a state in 1785 where the Loyalist
was allowed to vote. In New York Loyalist lawyers were
not allowed to practise until April 1786, and then only
on condition of taking an 'oath of abjuration and
allegiance.' In the same state, Loyalists were subjected
to such invidious special taxation that in 1785 one of
them confessed that 'those in New York whose estates have
not been confiscated are so loaded with taxes and other
grievances that there is nothing left but to sell out
and move into the protection of the British government.'</p>
<p id="id00096">It was clear that something would have to be done by the
British government for the Loyalists' relief. 'It is
utterly impossible,' wrote Sir Guy Carleton to Lord North,
'to leave exposed to the rage and violence of these people
[the Americans] men of character whose only offence has
been their attachment to the King's service.' Accordingly
the British government made amends for its betrayal of
the Loyalists by taking them under its wing. It arranged
for the transportation of all those who wished to leave
the revolted states; it offered them homes in the provinces
of Nova Scotia and Quebec; it granted half-pay to the
officers after their regiments were reduced; and it
appointed a royal commission to provide compensation for
the losses sustained.</p>
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