<p>Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was
ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis
and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing
death—if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil
the philosopher’s mission of searching into myself and other men, I were
to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed
be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence
of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying
that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the
pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the
unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to
be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not this ignorance of a
disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the conceit that a man knows what he
does not know? And in this respect only I believe myself to differ from men in
general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are:—that whereas I
know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know
that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and
dishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a
certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and are not convinced by
Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted I must be put to death; (or
if not that I ought never to have been prosecuted at all); and that if I escape
now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words—if you
say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let
off, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and speculate in this
way any more, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die;—if
this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I
honour and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have
life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of
philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to him after my manner:
You, my friend,—a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of
Athens,—are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money
and honour and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the
greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? And if
the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not
leave him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine and
cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says
that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the
less. And I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and
old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my
brethren. For know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no
greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I
do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take
thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care
about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given
by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public
as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which
corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if any one says that this is
not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say
to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not;
but whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if
I have to die many times.</p>
<p>Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an understanding
between us that you should hear me to the end: I have something more to say, at
which you may be inclined to cry out; but I believe that to hear me will be
good for you, and therefore I beg that you will not cry out. I would have you
know, that if you kill such an one as I am, you will injure yourselves more
than you will injure me. Nothing will injure me, not Meletus nor yet
Anytus—they cannot, for a bad man is not permitted to injure a better
than himself. I do not deny that Anytus may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him
into exile, or deprive him of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may
imagine, that he is inflicting a great injury upon him: but there I do not
agree. For the evil of doing as he is doing—the evil of unjustly taking
away the life of another—is greater far.</p>
<p>And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think,
but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am
his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me,
who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given
to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in
his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am
that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all
places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching
you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you
to spare me. I dare say that you may feel out of temper (like a person who is
suddenly awakened from sleep), and you think that you might easily strike me
dead as Anytus advises, and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your
lives, unless God in his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I
am given to you by God, the proof of my mission is this:—if I had been
like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently
seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours,
coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to
regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had
gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been
some sense in my doing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even the
impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of
any one; of that they have no witness. And I have a sufficient witness to the
truth of what I say—my poverty.</p>
<p>Some one may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying myself
with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and
advise the state. I will tell you why. You have heard me speak at sundry times
and in divers places of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the
divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This sign, which is a kind
of voice, first began to come to me when I was a child; it always forbids but
never commands me to do anything which I am going to do. This is what deters me
from being a politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of
Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and
done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling
you the truth: for the truth is, that no man who goes to war with you or any
other multitude, honestly striving against the many lawless and unrighteous
deeds which are done in a state, will save his life; he who will fight for the
right, if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private station and
not a public one.</p>
<p>I can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but what you
value far more—actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my own life
which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any
fear of death, and that “as I should have refused to yield” I must
have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts, not very interesting
perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held, O
men of Athens, was that of senator: the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had
the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of
the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a
body, contrary to law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the
only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote
against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and you
called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and
justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared
imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when
the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into
the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted
to put him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they
were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their
crimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed, that, if I may be
allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my
great and only care was lest I should do an unrighteous or unholy thing. For
the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong;
and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched
Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the
power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to
my words.</p>
<p>Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had
led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always maintained the
right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing? No indeed, men of
Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have been always the same in all my
actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base
compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples, or to any other.
Not that I have any regular disciples. But if any one likes to come and hear me
while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he is not excluded.
Nor do I converse only with those who pay; but any one, whether he be rich or
poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he turns out to
be a bad man or a good one, neither result can be justly imputed to me; for I
never taught or professed to teach him anything. And if any one says that he
has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has
not heard, let me tell you that he is lying.</p>
<p>But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you?
I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this matter: they
like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom; there is
amusement in it. Now this duty of cross-examining other men has been imposed
upon me by God; and has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in every
way in which the will of divine power was ever intimated to any one. This is
true, O Athenians, or, if not true, would be soon refuted. If I am or have been
corrupting the youth, those of them who are now grown up and have become
sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come
forward as accusers, and take their revenge; or if they do not like to come
themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen,
should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands. Now is their
time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age
and of the same deme with myself, and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also
see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of
Aeschines—he is present; and also there is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is
the father of Epigenes; and there are the brothers of several who have
associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the
brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any
rate, will not seek to stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus,
who had a brother Theages; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother
Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I
also see. I might mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus should have
produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let him still produce
them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him. And let him say, if he
has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very
opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the
corrupter, of the injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; not
the corrupted youth only—there might have been a motive for
that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support
me with their testimony? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice,
and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is a liar.</p>
<p>Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defence which I have to
offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is offended at me,
when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar, or even a less serious
occasion, prayed and entreated the judges with many tears, and how he produced
his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together with a host of
relations and friends; whereas I, who am probably in danger of my life, will do
none of these things. The contrast may occur to his mind, and he may be set
against me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at me on this account.
Now if there be such a person among you,—mind, I do not say that there
is,—to him I may fairly reply: My friend, I am a man, and like other men,
a creature of flesh and blood, and not “of wood or stone,” as Homer
says; and I have a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one
almost a man, and two others who are still young; and yet I will not bring any
of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Not from
any self-assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid of
death is another question, of which I will not now speak. But, having regard to
public opinion, I feel that such conduct would be discreditable to myself, and
to you, and to the whole state. One who has reached my years, and who has a
name for wisdom, ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be
deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way
superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in
wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how
shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they have been
condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they
were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be
immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that such are a
dishonour to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them
that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give
honour and command, are no better than women. And I say that these things ought
not to be done by those of us who have a reputation; and if they are done, you
ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show that you are far more
disposed to condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city
ridiculous, than him who holds his peace.</p>
<p>But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be something
wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal, instead
of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of
justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he will judge according to
the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure; and we ought not to
encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit
of perjury—there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do
what I consider dishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am
being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens,
by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should
be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should
simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not
so—far otherwise. For I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense
higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to
God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.</p>
<hr />
<p>There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at the vote of
condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly
equal; for I had thought that the majority against me would have been far
larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have
been acquitted. And I may say, I think, that I have escaped Meletus. I may say
more; for without the assistance of Anytus and Lycon, any one may see that he
would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which
case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae.</p>
<p>And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, O
men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my due? What return
shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole
life; but has been careless of what the many care for—wealth, and family
interests, and military offices, and speaking in the assembly, and
magistracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest a
man to be a politician and live, I did not go where I could do no good to you
or to myself; but where I could do the greatest good privately to every one of
you, thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must
look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private
interests, and look to the state before he looks to the interests of the state;
and that this should be the order which he observes in all his actions. What
shall be done to such an one? Doubtless some good thing, O men of Athens, if he
has his reward; and the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be
a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure
that he may instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in
the Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the
citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether
the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has
enough; and he only gives you the appearance of happiness, and I give you the
reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say that
maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just return.</p>
<p>Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in what I
said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I speak rather
because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one, although I
cannot convince you—the time has been too short; if there were a law at
Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be decided
in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you. But I cannot in a
moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged
another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I
deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why should I? because I am afraid of
the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death
is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be
an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, and be the
slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty
be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same
objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and cannot
pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the penalty which you will
affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of life, if I am so irrational as
to expect that when you, who are my own citizens, cannot endure my discourses
and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you will have no
more of them, others are likely to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is
not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city
to city, ever changing my place of exile, and always being driven out! For I am
quite sure that wherever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock to me;
and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their request; and
if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their
sakes.</p>
<p>Some one will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you
may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have
great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you
that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, and therefore that I
cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say
again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about
which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and
that the unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to
believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me
to persuade you. Also, I have never been accustomed to think that I deserve to
suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was
able to pay, and not have been much the worse. But I have none, and therefore I
must ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a
mina, and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and
Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minæ, and they will be the
sureties. Let thirty minæ be the penalty; for which sum they will be ample
security to you.</p>
<hr />
<p>Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for the evil name which
you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that you killed
Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me wise, even although I am not wise,
when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your desire
would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in
years, as you may perceive, and not far from death. I am speaking now not to
all of you, but only to those who have condemned me to death. And I have
another thing to say to them: you think that I was convicted because I had no
words of the sort which would have procured my acquittal—I mean, if I had
thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so; the deficiency which led
to my conviction was not of words—certainly not. But I had not the
boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me
to do, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and doing many things
which you have been accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I maintain,
are unworthy of me. I thought at the time that I ought not to do anything
common or mean when in danger: nor do I now repent of the style of my defence;
I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and
live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of
escaping death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will throw
away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape death;
and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if a man is
willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not to avoid
death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death. I am old
and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are
keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken
them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of
death,—they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the
penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must abide by my award—let them
abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as
fated,—and I think that they are well.</p>
<p>And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you; for I am
about to die, and in the hour of death men are gifted with prophetic power. And
I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that immediately after my departure
punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on me will surely await you. Me
you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an
account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For
I say that there will be more accusers of you than there are now; accusers whom
hitherto I have restrained: and as they are younger they will be more
inconsiderate with you, and you will be more offended at them. If you think
that by killing men you can prevent some one from censuring your evil lives,
you are mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or
honourable; the easiest and the noblest way is not to be disabling others, but
to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my
departure to the judges who have condemned me.</p>
<p>Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you about
the thing which has come to pass, while the magistrates are busy, and before I
go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a little, for we may as well
talk with one another while there is time. You are my friends, and I should
like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to me. O my
judges—for you I may truly call judges—I should like to tell you of
a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the divine faculty of which the internal
oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about
trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now as you
see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed
to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition,
either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when I was on my way to
the court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I was going to say; and
yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I
either said or did touching the matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What
do I take to be the explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an
intimation that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who
think that death is an evil are in error. For the customary sign would surely
have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.</p>
<p>Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to
hope that death is a good; for one of two things—either death is a state
of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and
migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there
is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even
by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select
the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to
compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell
us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and
more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private
man, but even the great king will not find many such days or nights, when
compared with the others. Now if death be of such a nature, I say that to die
is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey
to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, O my
friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim
arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in
this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there,
Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who
were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What
would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod
and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I myself, too,
shall have a wonderful interest in there meeting and conversing with Palamedes,
and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other ancient hero who has suffered death
through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in
comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to
continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in
the next; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is
not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of
the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men
and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and
asking them questions! In another world they do not put a man to death for
asking questions: assuredly not. For besides being happier than we are, they
will be immortal, if what is said is true.</p>
<p>Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty,
that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and
his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by
mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had arrived when it was better for
me to die and be released from trouble; wherefore the oracle gave no sign. For
which reason, also, I am not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers;
they have done me no harm, although they did not mean to do me any good; and
for this I may gently blame them.</p>
<p>Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask
you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have
troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about
virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really
nothing,—then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about
that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when
they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have
received justice at your hands.</p>
<p>The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you
to live. Which is better God only knows.</p>
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